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Thomas Mussweiler Universität Würzburg Previous research on self-other similarity judgments has demonstrated that perceived similarity between self and other depends on the focus of comparison. Based on the Selective Accessibility model, which assumes that comparisons with similar others yield assimilation, whereas comparisons with dissimilar others yield contrast, the author hypothesized that the focus of a social comparison would influence its consequences. Specifically, comparing the standard to the self (focus of comparison other → self) should increase perceived similarity so that self-evaluations are assimilated to the standard. Comparing the self to the standard (focus of comparison self → other), however, should reduce perceived similarity so that contrast ensues. This pattern was obtained in two studies. Moreover, Study 2 demonstrates that the occurrence of assimilation versus contrast as a consequence of manipulating the focus of comparison is mediated by the perceived similarity to the standard.
Social comparison processes (Festinger, 1954) exert powerful effects on our lives and well-being. Abundant research attests that they influence our self-evaluations (e.g., Brewer & Weber, 1994; Brown, Novick, Lord, & Richards, 1992; Lockwood & Kunda, 1997; Mussweiler & Strack, 2000b; Pelham & Wachsmuth, 1995) , affective states (e.g., Aspinwall & Taylor, 1993; Buunk, Collins, Taylor, VanYperen, & Dakof, 1990; Gibbons & Gerard, 1989; Reis, Gerard, & Gibbons, 1993; Tesser, Millar, & Moore, 1988) , and behavioral responses (e.g., Mussweiler & Strack, 2000b; Seta, 1982) , both for good and for ill (for recent reviews, see Collins, 1996; Wood, 1989) . Sometimes, social comparisons boost our confidence and lead to high levels of motivation and optimism, whereas at other times, they lead us to feel quite incompetent and ready to give up.
Predicting whether a particular comparison will lead to positive or negative consequences has proved to be a complicated matter. Early research (e.g., Morse & Gergen, 1970; Wills, 1981) made the straightforward assumption that the relative standing of the self to the comparison standard is the crucial moderator: Comparisons with less competent downward standards were assumed to produce positive consequences, whereas comparisons with more competent upward standards were seen as leading to negative results. More recent research, however, has shown that, holding the relative position of the standard constant, it is still possible for social comparison to lead to either positive or negative feelings and self-evaluations (e.g., Buunk et al., 1990; Pelham & Wachsmuth, 1995) . This variability in the consequences of social comparison is due to the fact that people sometimes assimilate their self-conceptions toward the standard, whereas at other times they contrast them away from the standard. Thus, an upward comparison may be inspiring if one assimilates selfevaluations to the standard and it may be deflating if one contrasts self-evaluations away from the standard.
To understand these variable consequences of social comparisons it is important to identify the specific conditions under which either assimilation or contrast ensues. And in fact, previous research has identified a number of potent moderators. Specifically, self-esteem (e.g., Aspinwall & Taylor, 1993; Buunk et al., 1990; Gibbons & Gerard, 1989) , psychological closeness (e.g., Brewer & Weber, 1994; Brown et al., 1992; Pelham & Wachsmuth, 1995; Tesser et al., 1988) , the relevance of the comparison dimension (Tesser, 1988) , and the attainability of the comparison standard (Lockwood & Kunda, 1997) appear to be important moderators (for a discussion of additional moderating variables, see Taylor, Wayment, & Carrillo, 1996) . This research has contributed substantially to our knowledge about social comparisons. Nevertheless, our understanding of the consequences of social comparison remained incomplete in that little was known about the psychological mechanisms that produce them (Wills & Suls, 1991; Wood, 1989) . What are the psychological mechanisms that underlie assimilation and contrast in social comparison? Which judgmental processes are responsible for the occurrence of either of these opposing consequences? Developing a judgmental model that is able to answer these questions may prove to be a fruitful endeavor in a quest for a more complete understanding of the social comparison process. Such a model also may help to derive novel predictions and identify additional factors that determine the psychological consequences of social comparison. Building on previous research on judgmental anchoring (Mussweiler & Strack, 1999b , 2000c Strack & Mussweiler, 1997 ; for an overview, see Mussweiler & Strack, 1999a) we have recently proposed a Selective Accessibility (SA) model (Mussweiler & Strack, 2000a , 2000b ) that attempts to answer these questions and to specify the judgmental processes that underlie the consequences of social comparisons.
SELECTIVE ACCESSIBILITY IN SOCIAL COMPARISON
On the most general level, the SA model holds that the self-evaluative consequences of social comparison depend on the self-related knowledge that is rendered accessible during the comparison process. The nature of this knowledge in turn depends on a hypothesis-testing process, which guides its generation during the comparison. We assume that in most cases people compare themselves to a given standard by testing the hypothesis that their standing along the judgmental dimension is similar to that of the comparison standard. For example, to compare your level of assertiveness to that of a highly assertive standard person, you may start with the hypothesis that you are similarly assertive as this standard. According to the SA model, you would test this hypothesis by generating evidence that is consistent with it (Trope & Liberman, 1996) . To compare your assertiveness with a highly assertive standard, you would thus generate evidence that implies that you are relatively assertive as well (e.g., you defend your opinion in discussions, you often manage to convince others). Doing so increases the accessibility of this evidence (Higgins, 1996) so that it is more likely to be used for subsequent self-evaluations. That is, if you were asked to evaluate your assertiveness subsequent to the comparison you would be likely to base this evaluation on the evidence you generated during the comparison process. In our example, you would thus use evidence that suggests that you are assertive as a basis for self-evaluation. Consequently, your final evaluation is likely to indicate that you are indeed fairly assertive. In this case, comparing yourself to a high standard leads to high evaluations of your own abilities. If judges test for similarity to the standard, the described selective accessibility mechanism is thus likely to produce an assimilation effect on self-evaluative judgments (for a more detailed discussion of the model and supporting evidence, see Mussweiler & Strack, 2000a , 2000b .
From this perspective, the self-evaluative consequences of social comparisons critically depend on the initial hypothesis that is tested during the comparison process. If judges test for similarity-as we have assumed in the above example-assimilation is likely to result. If, however, judges test for dissimilarity and selectively generate information that indicates that their standing along the judgmental dimension is different from that of the standard, contrast is more likely to occur. Which of these two alternative hypotheses is tested depends on an initial assessment of similarity. In particular, before engaging in the more elaborate hypothesis test, judges first have to generate the hypothesis that is to be tested. To do so, they may briefly assess how similar they are to the standard on the critical dimension (Festinger, 1954) as well as on related attributes (Goethals & Darley, 1977) and then test the hypothesis that is consistent with this initial impression. Thus, if the initial assessment indicates that they are similar to the standard, judges are likely to test this similarity hypothesis by generating information that is consistent with it. If, however, the initial assessment indicates that judges are different from the standard, they are likely to further test for dissimilarity. From this perspective, the consequences of social comparison critically depend on the initial assessment of similarity to the standard. The more similar judges initially see themselves to the standard, the more likely they are to deliberately search for further similarities during the comparison process and the more likely assimilation will ensue (for a discussion of similarity and assimilation in upward comparison, see Collins, 1996) .
This perspective on assimilation and contrast is quite consistent with the factors that have been found to moderate the self-evaluative consequences of social comparison. One central moderator is psychological closeness. If judges feel close to the comparison standard (i.e., they assume a unit relation) (Heider, 1958) , they tend to assimilate. If closeness is low, however, contrast is the more likely outcome (e.g., Brewer & Weber, 1994; Brown et al., 1992; Pelham & Wachsmuth, 1995; Tesser et al., 1988) . This may be the case because judges only test the hypothesis that they are similar to the standard when the other is close to them. Similarly, attainability of the standard's status may lead to assimilation (e.g., Buunk et al., 1990; Lockwood & Kunda, 1997; Taylor et al., 1996) because it allows for inclusion in the category of the standard and thus facilitates testing the similarity hypothesis.
This assumption that the perceived similarity to the standard influences the consequences of social comparison (i.e., whether assimilation or contrast ensues) holds an interesting implication. Specifically, changes in the social comparison process that influence the perceived similarity to the standard may change the direction of its effect on self-evaluation. One factor that may prove to be influential in this respect is the focus of the social comparison.
FOCUS OF COMPARISON AS A DETERMINANT OF PERCEIVED SIMILARITY
Research on self-other similarity judgments (e.g., Holyoak & Gordon, 1983; Karylowski, 1990; Srull & Gaelick, 1983) has repeatedly demonstrated that the magnitude of perceived similarity between the self and others depends on the specific focus of the comparison. Specifically, self and other are typically judged to be more similar if the other serves as the starting point or subject of the comparison (e.g., "How similar is X to you?") than if the self serves as a starting point (e.g., "How similar are you to X?"). One explanation for this asymmetry (e.g., Srull & Gaelick, 1983 ) is based on Tversky's (1977; Tversky & Gati, 1978) feature-matching model of similarity. According to this model, similarity is determined by matching features of the subject or starting point onto the features of the referent. Similarity is then primarily determined by the number of unique features of the subject (i.e., the features the subject does not share with the referent). The more unique features the subject has, the less similar it is judged to the referent. Of importance, the number of unique features that are identified during the feature-matching process is likely to depend on the relative elaborateness of the representation of the subject and the referent. The more elaborate the representation of the subject is compared to the referent, the more likely one is to find features that are unique to the subject. As a consequence, two objects that vary with respect to the elaborateness of their representation are likely to be judged as more similar if the less elaborate object is the starting point of the comparison because in this case the unique features of the elaborate object (the referent) weigh less heavily. Consistent with this assumption, it has been demonstrated that a prominent country (e.g., USSR) is judged to be more similar to a nonprominent country (e.g., Poland) if the latter is the starting point of the comparison (Tversky & Gati, 1978) .
Given that representations of the self are especially elaborate, this reasoning suggests that the self is likely to be seen as more similar to a social comparison standard if the standard rather than the self forms the starting point of the comparison. For example, one's own level of assertiveness may be seen as more similar to that of a social comparison standard if the standard serves as the starting point. Thus, similarity may be seen as higher if one is asked whether the standard is more or less assertive than oneself (i.e., focus of comparison is other → self) than if one is asked whether oneself is more or less assertive than the standard (i.e., focus of comparison is self → other). The above-cited research showing asymmetries in explicit similarity judgments (e.g., Holyoak & Gordon, 1983; Srull & Gaelick, 1983 ) is suggestive of this possibility.
From a selective accessibility perspective, however, the consequences of changing the focus of a social comparison are likely to extend beyond judgments of similarity. In fact, the SA model suggests that these differences in perceived similarity also may determine how a given social comparison influences self-evaluations. As outlined before, whether self-evaluations are assimilated toward or contrasted away from the standard depends on whether judges selectively search for similarities or differences with the standard during the comparison process. Testing the hypothesis that one is similar to the standard leads to assimilation, whereas testing for dissimilarity yields contrast. Conceivably, the similarity hypothesis is more likely to be entertained and assimilation is thus more likely to ensue if one perceives high similarity to the standard. In this respect, the self-evaluative consequences of a social comparison may dramatically depend on the focus of comparison. In fact, self-evaluations may be influenced in opposite directions (i.e., assimilated toward vs. contrasted away from the standard) depending on the focus of comparison.
In combination, the feature-matching perspective on similarity (Tversky, 1977) and the selective-accessibility perspective on social comparison (Mussweiler & Strack, 2000a , 2000b thus suggest that self-evaluations are more likely to be assimilated to the standard if the standard forms the starting point of the comparison. If the self constitutes the starting point, however, judges are likely to see themselves as less similar to the standard so that contrast may result. Research on self-other similarity judgments (e.g., Srull & Gaelick, 1983 ) has demonstrated that framing the comparison question in different ways is sufficient to produce substantial differences in the perceived similarity of self and other. Specifically, simply asking "How similar are you to X?" rather than "How similar is X to you?" is sufficient to significantly reduce perceived similarity. The SA model further suggests that this well-established influence on perceived similarity may have dramatic influences on self-evaluations. In fact, they may produce a shift in the overall direction (i.e., assimilation vs. contrast) of the self-evaluative consequences of social comparison. Study 1 was designed to examine this possibility.
STUDY 1
To do so, we framed explicit instructions to compare with a given standard in two different ways that varied the focus of comparison that was implied in them. All participants received information about the assertiveness of a comparison standard. Half of the participants were asked to compare the standard to themselves with respect to assertiveness (focus of comparison other → self), whereas the other half was instructed to compare themselves to the standard (focus of comparison self → other). Would such a transient manipulation of the focus of social comparison influence their consequences? Would assimilation result in the first case and contrast in the latter, as the above reasoning suggests?
Method
The methods we used to examine these questions closely followed those employed by Mussweiler and Strack (in press-a, see also Mussweiler & Strack, 2000b) . Specifically, participants were asked to compare themselves to a standard person who was described in a short paragraph. This person constituted a high or a low comparison standard on the critical dimension (i.e., assertiveness). Participants were instructed to compare their own standing on the critical dimension with that of the standard and the consequences of this comparison were then assessed with a number of self-evaluative questions (e.g., How often do you convince others?).
Participants. Forty-seven male and female undergraduates at Northwestern University participated as part of a course requirement. They were randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions. Materials. We constructed two different descriptions (8 to 9 lines each) of the social comparison standard ("Emily"). In the high-assertiveness version, Emily was described as a person who pursues her interests, defends her opinion in discussions, and often gets her way with her friends as well as her professors. In the low-assertiveness version, Emily was described as a person who is willing to compromise, very considerate in discussions, and often gives in to others. 1 We pretested these two versions by asking a different group of 37 participants who received either of the two descriptions to rate how well Emily manages to get her way (1 = very badly, 9 = very well). In this pretest, the high-assertiveness Emily was judged to be substantially better in getting her way (M = 7.17) than was the low-assertiveness Emily (M = 4.84), t(35) = 4.83, p < .001.
To assess the consequences that comparing themselves with the social standard has on participants' evaluations of their own assertiveness, we constructed a questionnaire that consisted of five critical questions. These questions were as follows: (a) Imagine you were having a 1-hour discussion about a topic that is really important to you. How often would you interrupt other discussants within this hour? (b) How resolutely would you defend your opinion (in such a discussion)? (1 = not at all resolutely, 9 = very resolutely) (c) What percentage of the situations in which your interests diverge from those of others do you get your way in the end? (d) How important is it to you to convince others of your point of view? (1 = not at all important, 9 = very important) and (e) How often did you manage to convince your friends to do something they initially were not enthusiastic about during the last month?
Procedure. Participants were contacted over phone and e-mail and scheduled for a group session of up to 20 participants. After arriving, they were greeted by the experimenter, handed a folder that included the experimental materials, and told to read instructions carefully. In the instructions, it was pointed out that the present study was a pretest aimed at identifying appropriate materials for future studies on person perception. Participants were further informed that they would receive a brief description of another person that they should read attentively. We would then ask them a series of questions about this person as well as themselves.
Participants were then instructed to read the standard description attentively and to form an impression of the described person. Half of the participants received the description of the high-assertiveness standard, whereas the other half received the description of the low-assertiveness standard. Next, they were instructed to compare with the standard. Half of the participants were told to compare Emily to themselves. For them, the instructions read as follows: "Now, please think of how well Emily manages to get her way. We would like you to compare Emily to yourself. Please try to determine whether Emily is better or worse in getting her way than you are." The other half was instructed to compare themselves to Emily. For these participants, the instructions read as follows: "Now, please think of yourself and how well you usually manage to get your way. We would like you to compare yourself to Emily. Please try to determine whether you are better or worse in getting your way than Emily." Participants were further instructed to allow themselves a few minutes to make this comparison and then indicate how difficult they found it to make the comparison (1 = not at all difficult, 9 = very difficult).
2
After comparing with Emily, we assessed participants' evaluations of their own assertiveness with the five questions described above. First, participants were instructed to answer all of the given questions and to do so as accurately as possible. Instructions further pointed out that there were no right or wrong answers for these questions and that in case participants were uncertain about one of the answers, they should give their best estimate. The critical questions then appeared in the same order they are listed above. After completion of the questionnaire, participants were thanked, debriefed, and dismissed.
Results
Self-evaluations of assertiveness. We combined the answers to the five critical questions into one assertiveness score. To do so, we transformed the responses to the individual questions into z scores and then calculated the mean. The resulting values reflect participants' average deviation from the question mean in units of the pertinent standard deviation. Note that the z transformation is necessary to allow for a comparison of answers given on different response scales (percentages, frequencies, etc.).
Previous research has demonstrated that under some circumstances the consequences of social comparisons depend on whether participants compare to a standard of the same gender or the other gender (e.g., Brown et al., 1992) . This may be the case because many attributes and behaviors are differentially characteristic for men and women (Biernat, Manis, & Nelson, 1991) . To ensure that such gender differences do not exist for our materials, we carefully selected behaviors that are similarly characteristic for men and women. As a consequence, we expected the predicted effects to be independent of participants' gender. To examine whether this is indeed the case, we conducted a preliminary 2 (high vs. low standard) × 2 (focus of comparison: self vs. standard) × 2 (male vs. female participant) ANOVA using the combined assertiveness score as the dependent measure. In this analysis, none of the effects involving gender approached significance, all Fs < 1.1. Consequently, we did not further consider this factor.
We predicted that participants who compared the standard to themselves (i.e., focus of comparison is other → self) would describe themselves as more assertive after comparing with the high than with the low standard (an assimilation effect). For participants who compared themselves to the standard (i.e., focus of comparison is self → other), just the opposite pattern was expected (a contrast effect). Mean self-evaluations are presented in Table 1 as a function of type of standard and focus of comparison. Inspection of the table reveals the expected crossover pattern. This interaction was found to be statistically reliable in a 2 (high vs. low standard) × 2 (focus of comparison: self vs. standard) ANOVA using the combined assertiveness score as a dependent measure, F(1, 43) = 4.37, p < .04. In this analysis, none of the remaining effects was reliable, all Fs < 1.
Contrast analyses further revealed that the difference between the high-and the low-standard conditions was significant for participants who compared the standard to themselves, t(43) = 1.75, p < .04 (one-tailed) and marginal for those who compared themselves to the standard, t(43) = 1.22, p < .11 (one-tailed).
Discussion
Consistent with our reasoning, these findings demonstrate that framing instructions to compare with a given standard in two different ways that vary the focus of social comparison had dramatic effects on its consequences. Specifically, it determined whether self-evaluations were assimilated toward or contrasted away from the standard. If the standard served as the starting point for the comparison (i.e., focus of comparison is other → self), assimilation resulted. If, however, the self forms the starting point, there was a tendency for contrast. The results of Study 1 thus provide the first demonstration that a social comparison with the very same standard may have opposing self-evaluative consequences depending on whether the self is compared to the standard or the standard is compared to the self.
Inspection of the means reveals that the contrast effect was somewhat weaker than the assimilation effect. This may be the case because the order in which the materials were presented may have conflicted with the focus of comparison suggested in the instructions. Recall that all participants received the description of the standard first and were subsequently instructed to think about their own assertiveness. This sequence may constitute a strong manipulation of the comparison focus in and of itself. Specifically, participants may be inclined to use the information they are given first as a starting point for comparison, regardless of the subtle manipulation 42 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN contained in the instructions. Consequently, two opposing tendencies may exist for participants for whom instructions suggested the self as a starting point. This may ultimately produce a weaker effect. The second study was designed to eliminate this potential procedural ambiguity. To do so, we manipulated the focus of comparison not only via instructions but also by changing the sequence in which descriptions of the standard and the self were processed. Participants in the other → self condition received the description of the standard first and then were instructed to describe themselves with respect to their assertiveness. Participants in the self → other condition, however, described themselves before they read the description of the standard. This matching of the sequence of self and standard descriptions with the focus of comparison implied in the instructions should create a more uniform tendency to compare in either of the two ways and should thus produce a stronger effect. In addition, Study 2 was designed to take a closer look at the role perceived similarity to the standard plays in the mediation of the obtained effect. Building on previous findings (e.g., Holyoak & Gordon, 1983; Srull & Gaelick, 1983) , we have assumed so far that the self is perceived to be more similar to the standard if the standard rather than the self serves as a starting point for the comparison. We have further assumed that such differences in perceived similarity mediate the obtained reversal in the self-evaluative consequences of social comparison. In combination with previous demonstrations of self-other similarity asymmetries (e.g., Holyoak & Gordon, 1983; Srull & Gaelick, 1983) , the results of Study 1 are clearly consistent with these assumptions. To provide more direct evidence, however, Study 2 assessed the perceived similarity of self and standard subsequent to the comparison. Based on the above reasoning, we expected perceived similarity to vary with the focus of comparison. Moreover, these differences in similarity should mediate the occurrence of assimilation versus contrast.
STUDY 2
Method
Participants. Thirty-seven female undergraduates at Northwestern University participated as part of a course requirement. They were randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions.
Materials.
The standard descriptions and the dependent measures were identical to those used in Study 1.
Procedure. Participants were contacted over phone and e-mail and were scheduled for group sessions with a maximum of four participants. After arriving, they were led to individual cubicles, given a folder that included the experimental materials, and told to read the instructions carefully. General instructions pointed out that the purpose of the study was to find adequate stimulus materials for future studies on person perception. Specifically, we were trying to pretest and construct descriptions of people on several different dimensions. To do so, we would ask participants a series of questions about themselves and a briefly described person.
As in Study 1, half of the participants received the high-assertiveness description of Emily, whereas the other half received the low-assertiveness description. In addition, we manipulated the focus of comparison by varying the order in which self description and standard description were given as well as the framing of the comparison question. Specifically, half of the participants (i.e., those in the other → self condition) were first instructed to read the following description of Emily carefully and to form an impression of her. They were then instructed to describe themselves in writing by telling them, "Now we would like you to describe yourself with respect to how well you manage to get your way. Please allow yourself a few minutes to describe yourself. How well do you manage to get your way?" These instructions appeared on the top of a separate page, the remainder of which was provided for participants' written self-descriptions. Subsequently, these participants were instructed to bring the description of Emily back to their mind, to compare Emily to themselves, and to determine whether Emily is better or worse in getting her way than they are. As in Study 1, they were asked to indicate how difficult it was to make this comparison (1 = not at all difficult, 9 = very difficult).
The other half of the participants (i.e., those in the self → other condition) were first instructed to describe themselves with respect to how well they manage to get their way and were then given the description of Emily with instructions to form an impression of her. These participants were then told to bring their self-description to mind, compare themselves to Emily, and determine whether they are better or worse in getting their way than she is.
For all participants, the comparison was followed by an assessment of their perceived similarity to Emily ("How much do you think you and Emily have in common?" 1 = very little in common, 9 = very much in common) and the same questions assessing self-evaluations of assertiveness that were used in Study 1. After completion of the questionnaire, participants were thanked for their participation, debriefed, and dismissed.
Results
Similarity ratings. As expected, participants perceived themselves to be more similar to Emily if the focus of comparison involved Emily (M = 5.4) rather than themselves (M = 4.1) as a starting point, F(1, 33) = 4.31, p < .05, for the main effect of focus of comparison. This difference was independent of whether the comparison involved the high or the low standard, F < 1, for the interaction. Overall, however, participants also saw themselves as more similar to the low (M = 5.6) than the high standard (M = 3.9), F(1, 33) = 7.17, p < .01, for the main effect of standard.
Self-evaluations of assertiveness. As in Study 1, answers to the five critical questions were combined into one assertiveness score. We expected the same pattern of results as in Study 1. Specifically, comparisons with the high standard should lead to more positive self-evaluations than comparisons with the low standard (an assimilation effect) when participants compared the standard to themselves. Just the opposite pattern (i.e., a contrast effect) was expected when participants compared themselves to the standard. Mean self-evaluations are presented in Table 2 as a function of type of standard and focus of comparison. As an inspection of the means reveals, the expected crossover pattern was obtained. This interaction proved to be significant in a 2 (high vs. low standard) × 2 (focus of comparison) ANOVA using the combined assertiveness score as the dependent measure, F(1, 33) = 15.29, p < .001. In this analysis, none of the remaining effects was reliable, all Fs < 1.7, all ps > .2.
Contrast analyses further revealed that the difference between the high-and the low-standard conditions was significant for participants who compared the standard to themselves, t(33) = 1.98, p < .04 (one-tailed) as well as for those who compared themselves to the standard, t(33) = 3.73, p < .001 (one-tailed).
Our reasoning suggests that the self-evaluative consequences of social comparison depend on the perceived similarity to the standard. Specifically, the greater the perceived similarity, the more self-evaluations should be assimilated toward the standard. Consistent with this assumption, correlational analyses demonstrated that self-evaluations of assertiveness were closely related to the perceived similarity to the standard. For the high standard, a strong positive correlation was obtained (r = .52, p < .01, one-tailed) such that the more similar to the standard participants perceived themselves, the more assertive they described themselves. For the low standard, however, a strong negative correlation resulted (r = -.62, p < .01, one-tailed) such that the more similar participants saw themselves to the standard, the less assertive they described themselves. In combination, these correlations indicate that the higher the perceived similarity, the more participants assimilated to the standard. Mediational analysis. We followed the suggestions of Baron and Kenny (1986) to test whether the effects of focus of comparison on self-evaluations of assertiveness are mediated by the perceived similarity to the standard. These authors recommend a series of three regression analyses to establish mediation. First, the mediator (i.e., similarity) is regressed on the independent variable (i.e., focus of comparison). Second, the dependent variable (i.e., self-evaluations of assertiveness) is regressed on the independent variable. And finally, the dependent variable is regressed on both the independent variable and the mediator.
To do these regression analyses, we first recoded our main dependent variable (i.e., self-evaluations of assertiveness) into an assimilation-contrast index. Note that for participants who compared themselves to the high standard, positive values for the mean assertiveness ratings (i.e., higher assertiveness) indicate assimilation and negative values indicate contrast. For participants who compared to the low standard, however, the reverse is true. Here, negative values (i.e., low assertiveness) indicate assimilation and positive values indicate contrast. To transform these ratings into one assimilation-contrast index, the z-transformed mean assertiveness ratings for the high-standard condition remained unchanged, whereas those for the low-standard condition were multiplied with -1. For the resulting score, positive values thus indicate assimilation, whereas negative values indicate contrast. This assimilation-contrast index was used as the main dependent measure for the regression analyses.
The first regression analysis revealed that focus of comparison (i.e., the independent variable) affected the perceived similarity to the standard (i.e., the mediator), β = .30, p < .07. 3 The second regression analysis demonstrated that focus of comparison affected the degree of assimilation (and contrast) to the standard (i.e., the dependent variable), β = .56, p < .001. Finally, the third regression analysis revealed that the degree of assimilation (and contrast) to the standard was affected by both perceived similarity, β = .39, p < .01, and focus of comparison, β = .45, p < .002. Moreover, a Sobel (1982) test demonstrated that the effect of focus of comparison on the degree of assimilation was significantly reduced when controlling for the effect of perceived similarity, Z = 2.31, p < .05. This pattern indicates that the effects of compari- son framing on self-evaluations were at least partially mediated through the effects the framing manipulation had on perceived similarity to the standard. Although this finding is generally consistent with our hypothesis, it is important to note that it does not indicate complete mediation. This suggests that-in addition to perceived similarity-the effects of the framing manipulation also are mediated by other factors. One possibility is that whether participants thought about their own assertiveness before being exposed to the standard description influenced the degree of assimilation and contrast independent of perceived similarity. In any case, these findings indicate that perceived similarity at least contributes to the effects of changes in the focus of comparison.
Discussion
These results replicate and extend those of Study 1. First, they again demonstrate that the focus of comparison determines whether self-evaluations are assimilated toward or contrasted away from the standard. If the standard served as a starting point for the comparison, assimilation resulted. Here, participants described themselves as more assertive after comparing with an assertive rather than an unassertive standard. If, however, the self was used as a starting point, contrast occurred: Participants described themselves as less assertive after comparing with the high than after comparing with the low standard. Moreover, the findings of Study 2 shed light on the role that perceived similarity plays in the mediation of these opposing consequences of social comparison. Consistent with previous research on the self-other similarity asymmetry (e.g., Holyoak & Gordon, 1983; Srull & Gaelick, 1983) , we demonstrate that self and standard are seen as more similar if the standard constitutes the starting point for the comparison. Moreover, our mediational analysis demonstrates that the occurrence of assimilation versus contrast is partially mediated by perceived similarity.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
We have examined the focus of a social comparison as a determinant of its psychological consequences. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate that participants assimilate their self-evaluations toward the standard if the standard serves as a starting point for the comparison (i.e., comparison focus is other → self). If the self serves as a starting point (i.e., comparison focus is self → other), however, self-evaluations are contrasted away from the standard. In Study 1, the focus of comparison was solely manipulated by subtle changes in the wording of the comparison instructions. Despite the subtlety of this manipulation, a reversal in the direction of the self-evaluative effects of social comparison was obtained.
Using a stronger manipulation, Study 2 replicated these findings and demonstrated that variations in the perceived similarity to the standard are-at least in part-responsible for the reversal. Consistent with earlier research on self-other similarity asymmetries (e.g., Holyoak & Gordon, 1983; Srull & Gaelick, 1983) , participants perceived themselves to be more similar to the standard if the standard rather than the self was the starting point of the comparison. Because the occurrence of assimilation versus contrast as a consequence of social comparison depends on the similarity of self and standard, differences in perceived similarity then yield the obtained differences in the effects of comparison.
The implications of these findings are manifold. First, they demonstrate that a previously neglected aspect of the social comparison process (i.e., the focus of comparison) constitutes a crucial determinant of their psychological consequences. Whether assimilation or contrast occurs depends on the seemingly trivial question of whether the self is compared to the standard or the standard is compared to the self. Of importance, Study 1 demonstrates that these opposing consequences of comparisons with identical standards can be brought about solely by subtle changes in the framing of the comparison. Simply suggesting a different focus of comparison in a comparative question determined whether the self was assimilated toward or contrasted away from the standard. Given that social comparisons dramatically influence our well-being, this finding suggests a simple device that may help to construct such comparisons in the most self-enhancing way. Specifically, using the self as a starting point may facilitate contrasting self-evaluations away from a downward standard, whereas using an upward standard as a starting point may facilitate assimilation to this standard. Thus, changing the focus of comparison may strategically be used to increase their self-enhancing potential and reduce their ego-deflating threat.
In a different vein, the current results further demonstrate the validity of a selective accessibility perspective on social comparison effects. The Selective Accessibility model (Mussweiler & Strack, in press-a, in press-b) explicitly acknowledges the importance of similarity and assumes that assimilation results only for comparisons with similar standards because only for these standards do judges test the hypothesis that their standing on the judgmental dimension is similar to the standard. For dissimilar standards, however, judges are more likely to assume that their standing differs from the standard, so that contrast is more likely to occur. The present findings provide an initial test of these assumptions and demonstrate that the more similar participants see themselves to the standard, the more they assimilate their self-evaluations toward him or her. In this respect, our findings emphasize the importance of similarity in the social com-parison process: High levels of perceived similarity correspond to assimilation in self-evaluations, whereas low levels of similarity correspond to contrast.
On a more general level, the current findings suggest that to fully understand the consequences of social comparison, one has to take a close look at the judgmental mechanisms that underlie the comparison process itself. Previous research has primarily focused on the moderating role of a specific set of characteristics of the standard (e.g., membership in the same or a different social group) and the self (e.g., self-esteem, importance of comparison dimension). The present research suggests that in addition to these variables, a different group of moderators also exists. Specifically, factors that are more closely related to the psychological structure of the comparison process itself critically influence the outcome of social comparisons. The focus of comparison constitutes one example of such a factor. Manipulating whether the self or the standard is used as a starting point proved to have dramatic effects on the consequences of social comparison, even when aspects of the self and the standard remained unchanged. This suggests that closely examining the cognitive underpinnings of social comparisons may prove a fruitful path to further our knowledge of this classic domain of social psychological research. NOTES 1. Note that to examine the assimilation and contrast effects we predicted, there is no need to include a neutral-standard or no-standard control group. In our paradigm, assimilation is evident if comparisons with high standards yield higher self-evaluative judgments than comparisons with low standards, and contrast is manifest if the reverse pattern occurs. A control group is only necessary to examine differences in the effects of the high and low standards, which was not the focus of the present research.
2. We did not ask participants to indicate whether they are more or less assertive than Emily because we expected such a judgment to have a distorting effect on subsequent self-evaluations. In particular, participants may try to appear consistent with the overall outcome of the comparison and make subsequent judgments accordingly. This is less likely to be the case if the difficulty rather than the outcome of the comparison is reported. Note also that participants did not make these comparisons in writing.
3. The effect of focus of comparison may have remained marginal because of our small sample size and the resulting low statistical power.
